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SC-TRUST: A Dynamic Model for Trustworthy 
Service Composition in the Internet of Things 
Anuoluwapo A. Adewuyi, Hui Cheng, Qi Shi, Jiannong Cao, Xingwei Wang, and Bo Zhou 
Abstract— A future Internet of Things (IoT) will feature a service-oriented architecture consisting of lightweight computing 
platforms offering individual, loosely-coupled microservices. Often, an end-user will request a bespoke service that will require a 
composition of two or more microservices offered by different service providers. However, the underlying complexities of soft 
compositions and the increased security risks are inherent in such a massively decentralised and distributed architecture. The 
use of trust management to secure the IoT is well studied in the literature. However, there are limitations to its use in service 
compositions in the IoT. Specifically, transparent (agnostic) trust composition and decomposition remain key problems for this 
area. A novel model for trustworthy service compositions in the IoT, SC-TRUST, is therefore proposed to deal with these 
challenges. In this study, the trust properties of service compositions and the effect of service workflows on transparent trust 
composition and decomposition are investigated. Based on the findings, relevant trust evaluation functions are derived to guide 
the compositions. SC-TRUST was implemented in a suitable application and its performance, in terms of the utility derived and 
the trust accuracy, convergence and resiliency, was evaluated. The results show that SC-TRUST improves the quality of service 
compositions and adequately mitigates trust-related attacks, thus increasing both efficiency and security. 
Index Terms— Service Composition, Internet of Things, Trust management, Collaborative computing, Distributed applications, 
Security and Privacy Protection 
——————————   ◆   —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
HE increasing development and pervasiveness of the 
Internet of Things (IoT) have facilitated the prolifera-
tion of a new generation of smart objects [1]–[5]. The po-
tential benefits and use cases of the IoT apply to virtually 
every domain of social life, including healthcare, transpor-
tation and agriculture [6]–[8]. The IoT requires the exten-
sive interoperability of heterogeneous devices, networks, 
and technologies, for which the traditional internet is ill-
suited. Therefore, a principal and necessary component of 
the future IoT will be the provision of bespoke services on 
the fly to satisfy dynamic user requirements. This will re-
quire the cooperation and collaboration of individual 
smart devices offering unique microservices. These micro-
services can be transparently composed, as required, to 
provide a service offering that is guaranteed to fulfil the 
user’s service requests [9]–[11]. The process by which this 
is done is called a service composition. In this context, 
transparency means that the inner working of the 
composition is abstracted from the users or entities inter-
acting with the composed service. Specifically, perfor-
mance, access and location transparencies [12] are implied. 
The composed service appears as a single service to the 
user requesting it, as the composition should be performed 
in an agnostic manner. The details of the underlying mi-
croservices and any middleware should be abstracted from 
the user [13]. 
In a service composition, the IoT middleware consists of 
a service-oriented architecture (SOA) where each con-
nected device is a service provider (SP) or a service re-
quester (SR) [7], [14]. The underlying microservices are 
hosted and provided by SPs, while the middleware layer 
accepts service requests from end-users, performs tasks 
such as service discovery and aggregation, SP selection, net-
work routing functions, and security and trust manage-
ment, and delivers the results of the composed service to 
the requesting user [15]–[18]. The middleware itself may be 
hosted in the cloud or by another device which provides the 
composition platform. A device may provide multiple ser-
vices, e.g. temperature and humidity sensing. However, 
each service usually belongs to a single service class, which 
is an abstraction for all services of the same type [10]. The 
output of one service may be passed as input to another. For 
example, the geographical coordinates from a GPS sensor 
may be passed to a weather forecast service and the forecast 
readings are returned to the user. The network between us-
ers, smart objects, and the services they offer forms the 
foundation of the concept referred as the Social Internet of 
Things (SIoT) [16], [19], [20]. 
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The need for secure and trustworthy service composi-
tions is evident. First, there may be multiple SPs offering 
the same functionality within a service class. In composing 
a user-requested service, it would be necessary to select the 
most reliable and least malicious SP in each required ser-
vice class. Therefore, some method must exist to identify 
malicious nodes and preclude their service offering from 
the composition [21]. Second, the middleware must con-
sider the compatibility of the service components to be 
mixed and matched, whilst ensuring that the results satisfy 
the requester’s utility [15], [22], [23]. The difficulty in find-
ing universal solutions for the IoT context establishes trust 
as, perhaps, the most important security metric in SOA-
based IoT systems. Trust management is wider in scope 
than traditional security management, in that it also ad-
dresses the quality of service (QoS) and reliability of SPs 
[16], [23], [24]. 
A trust management system (TMS) provides methods 
and mechanisms to evaluate the trustworthiness of inter-
acting peers, based on a trust model. The trust model de-
termines how trust is computed in a specific context. While 
several TMSs have been proposed for trust in generic IoT 
contexts, little work has been done on the management of 
trust in SOA-IoT contexts [14], [23]. Furthermore, these 
models do not consider transparent service compositions, 
where an SR can neither provide direct trust ratings on nor 
receive recommendations on SPs of the underlying ser-
vices. In addition, they do not consider the trustworthiness 
of the composed service separately from the trust ratings 
of the SPs. Also, there is an implicit assumption that, due 
to the social nature of SOA-based IoT, a social relationship 
exists between the owners of the participating IoT devices. 
Based on this assumption, such social relationships must 
factor into the trust estimation. However, in a true service-
based IoT where the primary incentive for interactions is 
to provide or request a service, no other relationship may 
exist among SPs and SRs outside the given service context. 
The implication is that these models may exclude trustwor-
thy nodes capable of delivering reliable services and in-
clude nodes owned by SPs who have an external social re-
lationship with the SR. Finally, these models do not respect 
privacy, as the middleware composing the service must be 
made aware of these relationships among the SPs and SR. 
In summary, there is a need for a reliable trust model to 
guide compositions of IoT services. In a previous work, the 
authors proposed a trust model, CTRUST, which focused 
on dynamic trust management for collaborative IoT appli-
cations [25]. In CTRUST, the parametrization, weighting, 
maturity, and decay of trust between nodes are accurately 
modelled based on suitable functional attributes of the 
nodes in the collaboration context, and in consideration of 
the trustor’s subjective preferences. In addition, the effects 
of recommendation on the trust evaluation process were 
studied. However, the work focused only on collaborative 
applications where the trustor (i.e. SR) directly requests 
and receives services from SPs and can, therefore, provide 
a direct trust rating of the nodes based on their perfor-
mance, thus establishing a trustor-trustee relationship. 
Even though service compositions are a special category of 
collaborative applications, there is no direct trustor-trustee 
relationship, meaning that the SR is unlikely to be aware of 
the identities or trust scores of the SPs given that the details 
of the composition is abstracted from the SR. Thus, the 
work in this paper significantly extends our CTRUST 
model, with a focus on dynamic trust management for ser-
vice compositions in the IoT. The extension includes the 
following novel contributions: 
1. We study the requirements for a suitable trust model 
for service compositions in the IoT context. 
2. We analyse existing techniques for service composition 
and provide methods for the derivation and aggrega-
tion of trust values based on the relevant trust param-
eters of SPs from different required service classes, ex-
tending our contributions in the CTRUST model. 
3. We provide a method to reliably estimate the trust 
score of the composed service based on the indirect 
trust scores computed for the SPs, in accordance with 
the SR’s requirements. Thus, it provides a novel pri-
vacy-preserving solution for transparent trust compo-
sition in the IoT. 
4. Finally, our model receives trust ratings from the SR based 
on the satisfaction degree on the composed service, and 
provides a reasonable method to indirectly update the 
trust scores of the underlying services. This solves the 
problem of transparent trust decomposition. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces related concepts, provides a comprehensive over-
view of service composition techniques, and highlights the 
necessary properties of an ideal trust model for service 
composition in the IoT. Section 3 specifies and analyses the 
SC-TRUST model design. In Section 4, the model is imple-
mented in a service composition application and its perfor-
mance is evaluated. Section 5 discusses and compares re-
lated work. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper and pro-
poses future work. 
2 PRELIMINARIES 
This Section presents an overview on service composition in 
the IoT and its implications for trust modelling. 
2.1 IoT Service Composition – Concepts & 
Techniques 
The IoT provides novel ways for users to interact with 
things around them. The data received from various sen-
sors in the environment can be utilized by multiple actua-
tors to achieve a desired result. Sensors and actuators have 
a broader meaning in this context and are not limited to 
traditional electronic devices. For example, a refrigerator 
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may “sense” it is empty of some food stuff and “actuate” 
an app on the owner’s phone to create a shopping list of 
such items. This list may be passed to an online grocery 
delivery service at regular intervals that are determined by 
a bot. At such intervals, the bot “actuates” the online ser-
vice to create an order and deliver the grocery. This concept 
of “social sensing” is one possibility of an SOA-based IoT. 
Usually, the service requested by a user will entail the col-
laboration of several microservices, as in the previous ex-
ample. Therefore, a bespoke service will be composed for 
the user, using two or more microservices which may be 
offered by different SPs. This architecture offers several ad-
vantages that are key to the realisation of the IoT vision, 
such as modularity, increased reliability and technology 
heterogeneity and interoperability. 
The manner and order by which services are composed 
plays a role in the trust evaluation strategy. Basically, ser-
vice compositions may be categorised in two ways. First, 
the mix of different classes of services involved may be 
considered. A service class is a logical unit into which SPs 
offering a similar service may be grouped together. It is an 
abstraction of a service type. Every service is a member of 
at least one service class. Secondly, service compositions 
may also be classified according to the sequence or work-
flow in which the services are ordered. We discuss both in 
detail in the following subsections. 
In connection with the service class, there are two kinds 
of service compositions: homogenous and heterogeneous. 
In a homogenous composition, all the underlying services 
are from the same class. An example would be an applica-
tion that allows the SR to request the assistance of some SPs 
in the collaborative download of a large file by pooling their 
bandwidths. Each service class is a self-contained collabora-
tion context to which a suitable IoT trust model, such as 
CTRUST [25], may be applied in selecting the most trustwor-
thy SPs.  
In a heterogeneous composition, the underlying services 
are mixed and matched from different classes. In this sce-
nario, the trust model must identify the most suitable SPs 
within each service class. The SPs are chosen based on their 
scores on relevant parameters and in line with the SR’s sub-
jective preferences. Heterogeneous compositions have far 
much more applications in the IoT than homogenous ones. 
Consequently, they are the major focus of service composi-
tion algorithms. As noted earlier, a node may simultane-
ously offer multiple services from more than one class. In 
such cases, there may be conflicts between the services 
which could lead to the performance degradation of some 
or all the services. 
The workflow refers to the order in which services are 
performed and composed. Generally, there are three basic 
types of workflow, which may be used in any combination. 
First, it may be a simple case of selection, where the SR re-
ceives a list of SPs along with their trust ratings. The SPs 
may not be from the same service class. Services may also 
be composed in a parallel workflow, where two or more SPs 
simultaneously provide the same or different services. 
Thirdly, services may be composed in a sequential work-
flow where the results from one service are provided to the 
next and so on, and the results of the second service are 
then returned to the SR. 
2.2 Ideal Trust Model for IoT Service Composition 
IoT applications generally consist of collaboration and ser-
vice provisioning [16]. Therefore, an ideal IoT trust model 
should provide a balance between security, functionality 
and usability whilst considering the constraints imposed 
by the limited resources available to most IoT devices. 
Given that service compositions are based on the task(s) 
demanded by the user, the trust score of the composed ser-
vice must be based on the efficient, reliable, risk-mini-
mized completion of the task(s). A review of the existing 
literature suggests that no work has focused on the decom-
position of trust scores assigned to composed services (that 
is, a top-down approach). 
A suitable trust model for service compositions must in-
clude methods for reliable trust composition; it must ade-
quately estimate the trust value of the composed service, 
based on the user’s utility preferences and the current trust 
scores of candidate SPs. Also, it must adequately model 
trust decomposition; it should accept the trust value given 
by the user upon consumption of the composed service 
and decompose that value to update the trust scores of the 
underlying services in a transparent manner. 
Based on the previous work done in [23]–[29], a list of 
suitable attributes for an ideal TMS for IoT were enumer-
ated and discussed in our previous work [25]. The list con-
sists of the following 9 properties: 1. Platform Consideration, 
2. Trust as a Decision (TaaD), 3. Contextual Trust Parametriza-
tion, 4. Trust Persistence, 5. Trust Decay, 6. Risk Mitigation, 7. 
Trust Accuracy, 8. Trust Convergence, and 9. Trust Resilience. 
In addition to these, trust models for service composition 
in the IoT must also possess the following requirements: 
10. Transparent Trust Composition: The trust model must in-
clude methods for estimating the trust score or trust-
worthiness of a composed service appropriately, con-
sidering the trust scores of the SPs, the service context, 
and the workflows involved in the composition. This 
should be done transparently to the SR; that is, the SR 
should not be aware of the internal details of the com-
position, or of the underlying services. 
11. Transparent Trust Decomposition: Ideally, the SR would 
give a trust score after consuming the composed ser-
vice. However, it has been established that the SRs will 
not interact directly with, or even know, the SPs in a 
service composition. Therefore, the TMS must incorpo-
rate methods to decompose the trust score from the SR 
and utilize it to update the trust scores of the 
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underlying services in an impartial and transparent 
manner. 
In Section 3, we will provide methods to extend the CTRUST 
model to IoT service compositions by fulfilling the last two re-
quirements. 
3 SC-TRUST MODEL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
We now propose SC-TRUST as a suitable trust model to 
guide compositions of IoT services. Underlying services 
and SPs are assumed to have trust scores assigned to them 
prior to the composition, based on their direct interactions 
with other nodes or peers outside a service composition 
context. Just as in CTRUST, a trust score is computed based 
on the objective measurement of a node’s performance on 
functional parameters, which form the basis on which the 
trust assessment is made. Trust criteria are modelled based 
on these parameters; a trustor determines the weights of 
each criterion. Trust scores are stored and are used to guide 
future interactions, although their importance declines 
over time. SC-TRUST extends the trust assessment, decay 
recommendation and aggregation functions of CTRUST to 
include two novel functions for transparent trust composi-
tion and decomposition. A high-level workflow of the 
model is illustrated in Fig. 1. A stepwise overview of the 
service composition process is given below: 
1. Underlying services are assessed on one or more trust 
criteria (parameters) relevant to their service class. The 
assessment results are called partial trust scores. 
2. An SR requests a request-granting service, which is the 
middleware for composing the services. A candidate 
platform would be a blockchain built for this purpose, 
similar to those proposed in [30]–[32]. 
3. The middleware composes a service workflow pattern to 
match the SR’s requests. Examples of candidate solutions 
exist in the literature [15], [18]. SC-TRUST can be inte-
grated into a suitable middleware platform. 
4. After the service workflow is decided, a handover is 
made to SC-TRUST to guide the actual composition pro-
cess. 
5. The prior partial trust scores on the parameters identified 
in (4) for each SP are aggregated according to the SR’s 
weight assignment, to calculate a single trust score for 
each SP. 
6. The trust score of the composed service is estimated 
transparently through a trust composition function 
based on the workflow, relevant partial trust scores of the 
SPs, and weights assigned by the SR. 
7. Upon service consumption, the SR may provide a score 
on each parameter, which is used to transparently up-
date the posterior partial trust scores of the SPs through 
a trust decomposition function. 
8. The trust decay and recommendation functions of 
CTRUST are inherited and utilized as required. 
We will outline the CTRUST functions mentioned in the 
above process and then proceed to discuss the extensions 
provided by the SC-TRUST model. Let S be the set contain-
ing the SR and all the SPs available for composition under 
the model. T[S], the trust space over S, is an octuple ex-
pressed by the following notation: 
𝑇[𝑆] ≡ [𝑇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑃,𝑊𝑖 , 𝑉𝑖𝑗 , 𝐹, 𝑡1
2
(𝑖), 𝐶, 𝐷] ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 (1) 
Where 
- 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the trust score of SP j from the perspective of SR i; 
- 𝑃 = {𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝2, 𝑝3, . . . , 𝑝𝑛} is the set of all trust parameters or 
properties from every service class in the composition; 
- 𝑊𝑖 = {𝑤𝑖(𝑝1), 𝑤𝑖(𝑝2), 𝑤𝑖(𝑝3), . . . , 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑛)}  is the set of 
weights on each parameter in P, as assigned by SR i; 
- 𝑉𝑖𝑗 = {𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝1), 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝2), 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝3), . . . , 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝𝑛)} is the set of val-
ues denoting SR i’s perceived assessment (partial trust 
score) of SP j on each parameter in P; 
- 𝐹 = 𝑓(𝑊,𝑉) ≡ 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the trust aggregation function; 
- 𝑡1
2
(𝑖) is the half-life of any partial trust score computed for i, 
that is, the time required for a partial trust score to decay to 
half its original value; 
- C is the trust composition function; and 
- D is the trust decomposition function. 
3.1 Adapted CTRUST Functions 
The CTRUST functions are adapted to model prior partial 
trust scores to determine which SPs may be selected to par-
ticipate in a service composition. 
3.1.1 Trust Parameters 
For any SP 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆, (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))
𝑡
 is approximately the same if 
measured by any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 at any time t prior to the composi-
tion. Suppose that a service composition with n unique ser-
vice classes,𝑄1…𝑄𝑛, is set up. Set P is populated with all 
the parameters from each service class. Some parameters 
 
Fig. 1. Basic processes involved for trust computation in SC-TRUST. 
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of a service class may not be useful to its role in the service 
composition and may be given a weight of zero, as we will 
show in Section 3.2.3. 
3.1.2 Parameter Weights 
The SR assigns weights to each parameter to reflect their rel-
ative importance based on the current subjective opinions of 
the SR. The weights provide a required differential factor in 
trust evaluation; thus an SP with a consistent behaviour and 
value set, V, may have a different perceived trust rating to 
different SRs. The weights are assigned such that: 
𝑊𝑖(𝑝) ∈ [0,1]∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 where ∑ 𝑊𝑖(𝑝)
𝑝∈𝑃
= 1 (2) 
SRs can assign a weight of zero to parameters they deem 
irrelevant to the service composition requested. They can 
also update their record of set W before any service com-
position request, according to changes, over time, in their 
perceptions of the relative importance of each parameter. 
This dynamic weighting considers changes in preference 
modelling; therefore, it is a more accurate adaptation of so-
cial human trust to IoT. 
3.1.3 Partial Trust Scores and Aggregation 
Set 𝑉𝑖𝑗  contains the normalized partial trust scores on each 
parameter p in P. These values are used for service compo-
sition and are updated per the SR’s post-service scores. The 
values are computed based on objective assessments that 
are weighted by the appropriate entry in the set W of the 
SR. The values are normalised to [0, 1] so that 𝑇𝑖𝑗  is also 
within the same range, and the normalisation method 
must be defined in the trust context. There are two factors 
to take into account in computing 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝) at any time: its 
previous value before the composition and the decom-
posed portion of the SR’s post-service score which is used 
to transparently update it. The prior value may be formed 
from direct interactions and, to a much lesser degree, indi-
rect assessments. The post-service trust score is derived 
from the assessment given by the SR upon consumption of 
the service, by means of a trust decomposition function 
which will be discussed in Section 3.3. The trust aggrega-
tion function, F, specifies how the partial trust scores are ag-
gregated to compute 𝑇𝑖𝑗. CTRUST uses a weighted sum func-
tion, 𝐹 = 𝑊 × 𝑉. Therefore, 
𝑇𝑖𝑗 =∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑥) × 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝𝑥)
𝑛
𝑥=1
∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑝𝑥 ∈ 𝑃 (3) 
3.1.4 Trust Decay 
An exponential decay function is used; the basis for this is 
outlined in [25]. The function can be expressed mathemat-






































= 𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑡 (6) 
Where 
- (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))0 is a partial trust score at the end of the last ses-
sion of interactions between i and j;  
- (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))0→𝑡 is the current value of (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))0 after time t of 
no interactions between i and j; 
- 𝜆𝑖 is a decay constant for partial trust scores from i; and 
- (𝜙𝑖)𝑡 is the trust decay multiplier for SR i, which is a pro-
portion of the partial trust score that has not decayed after 
time t of no interaction. 
Equation (4) can be simplified and rewritten as: 
(𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))
0→𝑡
= (𝜙𝑖)𝑡 × (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))
0
∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 (7) 
After an adequate number of interactions in a new session, 
the effective proportion of (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))0 that determines 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝) 
in a session becomes 0, based on the trust maturity factor 
to be defined in Section 3.1.6. 
3.1.5 Trust Recommendations 
A belief function is used to accurately model recommenda-
tions in CTRUST, and its mathematical expression is: 





|) × (1 − 𝜙𝑖) × 𝑉𝑖𝑘(𝑝) (8)  
This belief function indicates how much a node i is will-
ing to accept a recommendation on j from k, i.e. the weight 
that i assigns to that recommendation. Therefore, it deter-
mines i’s indirect assessment of j on parameter p through k, 
which is defined as: 
Ψ𝑖𝑗←𝑘(𝑝) = 𝛽𝑖𝑗←𝑘 × 𝑉𝑘𝑗(𝑝), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 (9) 
A node cannot provide recommendations on itself. This 
comprehensively defends against self-promotion attacks. 
Once new interactions begin between i and j, then 𝛽𝑖𝑗←𝑘 = 0. 
Accordingly, and together with the trust decay function, the 
ability of malicious nodes to perform ballot-stuffing, bad-
mouthing or on-off attacks is severely limited. This ensures 
the reliability of the computed prior partial trust scores. 
3.1.6 Trust Maturity 
The concept of trust maturity is introduced so that trust 
values may be updated reliably and consistently. Let Γ be 
the number of interactions required to reliably measure 
𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝) based on direct assessments, 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑝), only. Therefore, 
Γ direct interactions between any two nodes in any session 
are sufficient to attain a trust maturity or equilibrium. The 
value of Γ depends on the service class concerned and must 
be determined by direct interactions with the SPs in the 
class before a service composition. After Ζ interactions be-
tween i and j in a new session, the effective proportion of a 
previous trust score, (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))
0
, is given by: 
𝜇𝑖 = max((1 −
𝑍
Γ
) × (𝜙𝑖)𝑡 , 0) (10) 
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In other words, once 𝑍 ≥ Γ, 𝜇𝑖 = 0. At the start of a new 
session of interactions between i and j, we set the initial 
value of the direct trust assessment as 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑝) = 0.5. This is 
the midpoint between complete distrust (0) and perfect 
trust (1). It is the neutral prior probability of trust, and the 
default value of the partial trust score, 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝), in the ab-
sence of previous interactions or recommendations. Hav-
ing discussed all the three factors (i.e. trust decay, recom-
mendation and maturity) which affect the prior trust val-
ues of any SP j before the service composition, they can be 
aggregated for SR i to update SP j’s trust value on each pa-
rameter p at time t after the activation of the composed ser-
vice, which is denoted as (𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))
𝑡
. Let 𝐺 ⊆ 𝑆 be the set of 
nodes with each having a recommendation on SP j. Sup-
pose that there are s nodes in G: 𝐺(1)…𝐺(𝑠) . Then 
(𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑝))
𝑡


















𝑖𝑓 𝑍 > 0
(11)
∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝐺(𝑥) ∈ 𝐺, 𝑗 ∉ 𝐺
  
The first case (Z = 0) applies at the start of new interactions 
between i and j. The purpose of the CTRUST functions is 
to determine which SPs would be selected a priori from 
each service class. This score becomes (𝑉𝑖(𝑝))𝑜 just before 
the instantiation of the composition, and it is used in esti-
mating the trust of the composed service. The partial trust 
scores for each SP may be stored in a decentralised archi-
tecture, such as in a blockchain, where similar composition 
platforms may access these values. The details of the stor-
age and retrieval mechanisms are abstracted for the pur-
pose of this paper. Having adapted the functions of 
CTRUST, we focus on its extension for service composi-
tions in the subsections below. 
3.2 Transparent Trust Composition 
Upon consumption, the SR’s posterior feedback may indi-
cate a higher or lower level of satisfaction compared to the 
prior estimated score. A reliable prior trust estimate should 
not be higher than the posterior feedback from the SR. 
Therefore, a novel, bottom-up approach is proposed to com-
pose the trust value. The objective here is to satisfice [33], that 
is to initially find a suitable composition which meets the 
SR’s threshold, even if it is not the best possible composition. 
This is an optimal strategy because it reduces the time, en-
ergy and computational costs involved in composing a ser-
vice. Then, based on the feedback from the SR, we can up-
date the trust scores of the SPs and compose a better service 
with every iteration. 
The set of prior partial trust scores of each selected SP j 
is denoted now as 𝑉𝑗 , and the set P contains all parameters 
for all service classes represented in the composition. The 
SR assigns weights to each of these parameters to indicate 
their order of relative importance. This could be imple-
mented in several ways. One way would be to assign a de-
fault weighting of 0.5 on a scale of 0 to 1.0 for each param-
eter. Then the SR can adjust the weighting of any parame-
ter as desired. Another method could be to request that the 
SR provide pairwise comparisons or ratios on matched pa-
rameters (e.g. taxi fare vs cleanliness, cleanliness vs vehicle 
emissions). Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) methods 
can then be used to elicit consistent weights for each pa-
rameter. Once the weights have been determined, we can 
proceed to estimate the trust score of the composed service 
recursively, as determined by the workflow. Each work-
flow is resolved to an equivalent single service character-
ized by an appropriate set of partial trust scores. The 
method by which this is done for each workflow type is 
discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2.1 Selection Workflow 
In a selection workflow, the SR must select one SP from a 
group of two or more SPs from the same or associated ser-
vice classes and offer similar services. Therefore, we know 
that this group can be represented by the SP with that high-
est trust score, as this is the SP most likely to be chosen by 
the SR. Once an SP is chosen, the services of the others are 
not used (not at this level, at least) and therefore do not 
impact on the composite trust score. Therefore, to resolve 
or simplify this workflow, we determine the SP with the 
maximum prior trust score based on the partial trust val-
ues on the same set of parameters, using weights assigned 
by the SR. Let Q be the set of SPs from which a selection is 
to be made, and R ⊆ P be the set of parameters common to 
every member of Q. Thus, we compute: 
𝑇𝑗 =∑ 𝑤(𝑝𝑥) × 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑥),
𝑝𝑥 ∈ 𝑅
 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑄 (12) 
Therefore, the set Q can be resolved to a single logical 
service that has the equivalent trust characteristics (the 
same set of partial trust scores, V) as the SP with the highest 
trust score as computed by the above equation. Two or 
more SPs may tie for the highest trust score. This does not 
affect the resolution of the services, because the trust score 
represents the estimated maximum utility that the SR may 
derive from the consumption of any of such services. Un-
less there are other non-functional constraints, we can 
choose the partial trust score set of any of these SPs for the 
equivalent logical service. This set is represented mathe-
matically by: 
𝑉 ≝ 𝑉𝑗 , where 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥({𝑇𝑙}𝑙∈𝑄) (13) 
3.2.2 Parallel Workflow 
In a parallel workflow, multiple SPs provide services con-
currently. The SPs may be of the same or different service 
classes. Considering the case of SPs from the same class, 
the collective services provided by the group of SPs could 
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be reliably substituted by a single service with a partial 
trust score equal to the average group score on each trust 
parameter. Suppose that the SPs are from different service 
classes. The SPs could be logically replaced by a single ser-
vice that offers both services. This single service has a set 
of partial trust scores that is given by the union of the sets 
of partial trust scores of all the SPs. Where two or more SPs 
have a partial trust score on the same trust parameter, the 
replacement service is assigned the average (arithmetic 
mean) value of the scores on this parameter. This is true for 
both cases above.  
To formalise the above cases, let Q be the set of SPs in 
the parallel workflow and R ⊆ P be the set of unique pa-
rameters for all the SPs in Q. Then the set V for a single 
service to replace Q is given by: 
𝑉 ≝ {





𝑜𝑗(𝑝𝑥)  =  {
1, if 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑥) ∈  𝑉𝑗
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑄, 𝑝𝑥 ∈ 𝑅
(14) 
Here, 𝑜𝑗(𝑝𝑥) is used to decide whether partial trust score 
𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑥) is in SP j’s set 𝑉𝑗 . Every value in 𝑉 is the average par-
tial trust score computed separately on each parameter 𝑝𝑥 
in R from all the partial trust scores on 𝑝𝑥 collated from the 
SPs in Q. 
3.2.3 Sequential Workflow 
Every service composition can eventually resolve to a se-
quential workflow. To understand how two microservices 
composed in sequence may affect the prior trust estimation 
of the composed service, we study one example. 
Suppose that the SR is visiting a new city and does not un-
derstand its language. The SR wants a summary of Internet 
articles about one museum to be translated to the SR’s na-
tive language. Two microservices are required for the com-
posed service: a summarization service with both accuracy 
and response time parameters; then a translation service 
with an accuracy parameter. Suppose that the selected 
summarization SP has prior partial trust scores of 0.7 and 
0.9 on accuracy and response time, respectively. The trans-
lation service has an accuracy of 0.8. In this case, the accu-
racy parameter is a shared parameter belonging to two or 
more service classes in the composition. If the SR-assigned 
weights are 0.7 and 0.3 for accuracy and response time re-
spectively, then the prior trust score of the composed ser-
vice is computed as: 
Min. (0.7, 0.8) * 0.7 + 0.9*0.3 = 0.76 
Therefore, we can now define the trust characteristics for a 
single logical service that is reasonably equivalent to two 
or more services in a sequential workflow. Let Q be the set 
of all SPs in a sequential workflow and R ⊆ P be the set of 
unique parameters for all the SPs in Q. Then the set V of 
the single service is the union of all distinct elements which 
have a non-zero weighting, taken from the sets of partial 
trust scores of all the SPs in Q. Where two or more SPs each 
have a partial trust score on the same (shared) parameter, 
the set V contains the minimum partial trust score on this 
parameter. The minimum partial trust score is computed 
separately for each parameter in R. This is represented 
mathematically by: 




Having discussed the methods by which each type of 
workflow may be resolved into and replaced by a single 
equivalent logical service, we can apply them recursively 
as required until the whole composition is replaced by an 
equivalent logical service that is defined by the appropri-
ate trust characteristics in its set V. Then the estimated trust 
score of the composed service is equivalent to the trust 
score of this logical service and computed according to the 
following equation, where 𝑤(𝑝𝑥) = 0  if no weight is as-
signed to 𝑝𝑥 by the SR: 
𝑇 =∑ 𝑤(𝑝𝑥) × 𝑉(𝑝𝑥)
𝑝𝑥 ∈ 𝑃  
(16) 
This model is the view that the SR “sees” in interacting 
with the composed service. The SR need not have any 
knowledge of the individual underlying microservices. 
Also, none of the SPs gains any knowledge of either the SR 
or another SP from the composition process. Therefore, the 
method is privacy-preserving and makes it sufficiently dif-
ficult for an adversary to bad-mouth, ballot-stuff or perform 
on-off attacks. The SR then gives a posterior trust evaluation 
after consuming the service. The method by which this pos-
terior score is transparently decomposed is discussed in the 
next section. 
3.3 Transparent Trust Decomposition 
The composed service consists of several microservices. 
Therefore, a method is required to reliably decompose the 
partial trust scores given by the SR to the underlying ser-
vices in a reasonable and impartial manner. This should be 
done through a top-down approach to persist the logical 
view of the composed service to the SR and hide any details 
of the underlying services. While this is a novel and com-
plex problem in the IoT, it is somewhat similar to the prob-
lem of group assessment in education [34]–[36]. 
Some observations can be made from the studies cited 
above. First, group assessments can be an effective method 
for both the assessor (SR) and the assessee (SPs). It can in-
crease coordination, cooperation and collaboration among 
the assesses whilst providing a straightforward way for the 
assessor to evaluate the performance of all the group mem-
bers at once. However, it may give malicious SPs an in-
ducement to “free-ride” because the differential contribu-
tions of SPs are not acknowledged given that everyone gets 
the same scores on the same parameters. Also, it may de-
incentivize high performing SPs because they may be pun-
ished for the low performance of other SPs. 
Several methods have been proposed to improve the 
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quality and fairness of group assessments. Among them, 
one method assigns both a group score and an individual 
score to every member. The individual component is based 
on a separate piece of work produced by each group mem-
ber. Thus, the advantage of collaboration and group assess-
ment may be achieved whilst providing an incentive for 
improving individual performance. Similarly, the individ-
ual component punishes bad or low-performing members, 
thus creating a fair distribution of the marks among the 
group members. These characteristics make this method 
feasible in our context. Moreover, the group members are 
not required to provide feedback on their peers. Therefore, 
it maintains the privacy aspects of the composition. 
Oftentimes, only one SP per service class would be re-
quired in a service composition. Although service classes 
may share parameters, each service class is usually differ-
entiated by at least one parameter. This creates a method 
to give an individual rating to an SP of the same class. 
Therefore, an SP j from any service class would share at 
most n-1 trust ratings with another SP from a different ser-
vice class, and the rating for at least one parameter would 
uniquely apply to j. Usually, this unique parameter is also 
the defining parameter regarded by most SRs. Thus, it is 
appropriate to expect that these defining parameters 
would incentivize better quality of service from good 
nodes and significantly lower the trust scores of malicious 
nodes. The set of unique parameters, U⊆ P, is expressed 
mathematically by the following equation: 
𝑈 ≝ {𝑝 ∶  𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 ∧∑ 𝑜𝑗(𝑝)
𝑗 ∈ 𝑆
= 1} (17) 
Suppose that an SP adjusts its service provision such 
that it receives good ratings on its unique parameters but 
bad ratings on the others. This is an opportunistic service 
attack. However, the attack fails in our model because the 
SP destroys its own reputation as well with no overall 
gains. Our model can also deter such attacks. First, the SP 
does not know the identities of other SPs involved in the 
collaboration. Second, the middleware platform is a 
“wholesale buyer” of services and interacts directly with 
the SP. The SP cannot selectively attack service composi-
tions because it cannot tell whether its services are being 
utilized in a composition or otherwise. Third, given that 
there are costs to service provisioning and that the SP can-
not gain from malicious behaviour, a rational SP would be 
motivated to provide good services. 
On a shared parameter, the post-service trust score re-
ceived from an SR is decomposed according to the individ-
ual partial trust scores as defined in Equation 11 and the 
composed partial trust score on that parameter as defined 
in Equation 15. Suppose 𝑉(𝑝) and 𝑉+(𝑝) are the composed 
and post-service feedback scores, respectively, on parame-
ter p. Then, the partial trust score of each SP sharing this 
parameter is updated according to the following equation: 
𝑉𝑗
+(𝑝) = 𝑉𝑗(𝑝) + (𝑉
+(𝑝) − 𝑉(𝑝)) ×
𝑉𝑗(𝑝)
∑ 𝑉𝑗(𝑝)𝑗∈𝑆 ∧ 𝑜𝑗(𝑝)=1
(18) 
Where 𝑉𝑗(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑗
+(𝑝) are the pre-service and updated 
partial trust scores, respectively, for SP j on parameter p. 
Equation 18 utilizes a game theory approach that de-incen-
tivizes free-loading. This is achieved by differentially pe-
nalizing each SP sharing the parameter if the post-service 
score is lower than the prior estimated score. Given that the 
SPs have zero knowledge of the partial trust scores of one 
another, a rational SP would act to avoid the penalty by 
ensuring that the posterior score received on the shared pa-
rameter is as high as possible. Also, given that an SP cannot 
readily tell whether its services are being offered directly 
to a node or to a composition platform, a rational SP would 
seek to avoid being penalized so that its partial trust scores 
can remain high enough to be selected to provide services 
in the future. This fosters cooperation and motivates each 
SP to provide their best possible service. 
Table 1 provides a brief description of some relevant 
model variables. The above discussion shows that the SC-
TRUST model is privacy-preserving and transparent to 
both the SP and the SR and can significantly reduce the 
ability to perform maliciously. SC-TRUST can also deter 
the middleware platform from being biased or malicious. 
This is because good SPs who have received good ratings 
from other nodes or platforms would eventually decline to 
TABLE 1 
LIST OF MODEL VARIABLES 
 
Symbol Description Type 
𝑇𝑖𝑗  Trust value of j as computed by i, at the current 
instance and context 
Derived 
𝑝 A trust metric or parameter by which trust is 
assessed in the current context 
Design 
𝑤𝑖(𝑝) The importance of p as determined by i Input 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 (𝑝) The direct assessment score of j, as measured or 




 The trust score of j, as determined by i, on 




 The trust score of j, as determined by i, on 
parameter p, at the end of the last session 
Derived 
(𝜙𝑖)𝑡  weight of (𝑉𝑖𝑗 (𝑝))
0
in next session of interactions 




 The real value of (𝑉𝑖𝑗 (𝑝))
0
 that determines 
(𝑉𝑖𝑗 (𝑝))
𝑡
 at time t, in the current session 
Derived 
𝜇𝑖  Best defined as (𝑉𝑖𝑗 (𝑝))
0→𝑡
 / (𝑉𝑖𝑗 (𝑝))
0
 Derived 
𝛽𝑖𝑗←𝑘  The proportion of a recommendation on j, from k, 
that i is willing to accept 
Derived 
Ψ𝑖𝑗 ←𝑘(𝑝) The indirect assessment score of j on parameter p, 
as received by i from k, based on 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ←𝑘  
Derived 
Γ Number of interactions in a session required to 
reliably measure trust by direct assessment only 
Design 
N[C] Number of all nodes in the collaboration context 
and community, C 
Input 
N[G] Number of nodes in C that are actively in 
collaboration with i at the current instance 
Input 
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interact with a misbehaving middleware platform. There-
fore, the quality of its composed services would be low, 
and SRs would no longer subscribe to its services, leading 
to a loss of reputation and revenue. Given that there are 
other such composing platforms from which SRs can re-
quest services, the provider of the platform is motivated to 
remain neutral and provide trustworthy services. 
4 MODEL PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION 
SC-TRUST was evaluated in a collaborative download 
(CD) application similar to [25], but with a service compo-
sition approach, instead. The evaluation is approached 
along two different strategies. In the first, we evaluate the 
impact of the model on the level of utility gained by an SR. 
We compare the performance of the trust-based composi-
tion to a random composition and an SR-composed com-
position (that is, the SR directly shops for the individual 
services). In the second, we evaluate three major trust 
properties of the model, namely trust accuracy, conver-
gence, and resilience. We compare the results to those ob-
tained in CTRUST. Through this we show the efficiency of 
the model in service composition applications, as well as 
the effectiveness of the model in mitigating trust-related 
attacks.  
Given that the model is based on CTRUST, it inherits the 
verified methods of trust persistence, decay, and para-
metrization. The trust properties of platform consideration 
and Trust as a decision (TaaD) are implicit in the model’s de-
sign. We will show that the trust composition and decom-
position methods provide reliable estimates of the trust 
values of an SP and approach the ground truth values. 
Overall, we prove that SC-TRUST includes all the attrib-
utes required in an ideal trust model for IoT service com-
position, as enumerated in Section 2.2. 
In Section 4.1, the experimental setup is outlined, and 
the parameters are defined. In Section 4.2, the utility of the 
model is evaluated to determine the accuracy of the trans-
parent trust composition in SC-TRUST. Lastly, the trust 
properties (accuracy, convergence, and resilience) of the 
model are evaluated in Section 4.3, and they show the ef-
fectiveness of the transparent trust decomposition method. 
4.1 Context Overview: Collaborative Downloading 
Collaborative downloading (CD) is a concept well studied 
in the literature [37]–[39]. Usually, it employs a peer-to-
peer (P2P) paradigm and involves the pooling of the band-
width of multiple devices to download a common re-
source. This has potential applications in SOA-IoT. We uti-
lize the experimental setup described in our previous work 
[25] and adapt it from a direct collaboration to a service 
composition. The hardware remains the same, but the vir-
tual environment is Mininet, an emulator for prototyping 
Software Defined Networks (SDN), running in VirtualBox. 
An emulator, rather than a simulator, is used to better 
model the host and network constraints in IoT networks. 
Mininet was chosen because it suits SDN-type networks 
and is easily extensible for our purpose. In addition, it is 
open source, written in python and well-documented. This 
supports reproducibility of both the experimental setup 
and results. 
The composition process is as follows: first, an SR re-
quests a CD session, sending the URL of the file to be down-
loaded as input. Then the middleware composes the ser-
vices as follows: SPs which offer the download services are 
selected through the trust management system. The down-
load services are composed in sequence with an aggrega-
tion service offered by a different SP. The aggregation SP 
divides the resource into workloads or blocks, verifies the 
downloaded contents, and checks for errors or malicious 
modifications. Then, it aggregates the verified blocks into 
the originally requested resource and sends the complete 
content to the SR over the local network connection. The 
communication protocol is managed by the middleware 
layer in a way that preserves the privacy of the SPs. This 
setup is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
The trust parameters are based on functional require-
ments which are considered by researchers to be the most 
important for a successful collaborative download. Thus, 
the set P of all the trust parameters from both service classes 
in the composition contains three elements, namely, Suc-
cessful Completion Rate (SCR), Cumulative Bandwidth Average 
(CBA), and Inverse Risk Index (IRI). These have been dis-
cussed extensively in [25]; thus, we focus only on the mod-
ifications in this paper.  
The SCR is designed as a parameter unique to the aggre-
gation service class whilst the CBA and IRI are unique to the 
download service class. In this setup, however, there is one 
aggregation SP and a group of 3 to 8 download SPs for each 
CD session. Therefore, the download SPs share the scores 
assigned by the SR on the CBA parameter, according to the 
 
Fig. 2. Service composition for a collaborative download, consisting of 
one aggregation SP and three download SPs working in parallel. 
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transparent trust decomposition method discussed. The IRI 
is automatically assessed internally based on the criteria 
stated above. However, the SR may assign a weight to each 
of the parameters. It is assumed that the SR initially assigns 




The partial trust score of the composed service is computed 
according to the relevant transparent trust composition 
equation. 
The purpose of these experiments is to show that the 
trust scores obtained by both transparent trust composi-
tion and decomposition are not significantly different from 
the scores that would have been elicited if the SR was in a 
direct collaboration with the SPs. Therefore, we show that 
by utilising a robust trust model as SC-TRUST, the ad-
vantages of service composition in IoT can be achieved 
whilst mitigating the realisation and effects of trust risks. 
In our simulation, there are 5 members of the aggrega-
tion service class, and one is selected per CD session. There 
are 10 members of the download service class, and a range 
of 3 to 5 SPs are selected for each CD session. During a CD 
session, the aggregation SP may not be changed, but down-
load SPs may be removed and/or added to the composition 
as required. The SPs are simulated using a uniform ran-
dom distribution such that their behaviour should yield a 
partial trust score (that is, the ground truth value) in the 
range [0.5,1]. Thus, there is a uniform distribution of mali-
cious or underperforming SPs as well as good, high-per-
formance SPs. The simulation involves 100 such download 
sessions. 
4.2 Evaluating Utility Gain in SC-TRUST 
The purpose of utilising multiple download SPs is to in-
crease the throughput, that is the speed at which the 
content is retrieved and delivered to the SR. Therefore, a 
faster download increases the utility gained by the SR. Fig. 
3 illustrates the relative speedup (in comparison to the SR’s 
average download speed) achieved for different cardinali-
ties of the set Q of download SPs. We compare the 
speedups achieved using: (i) SC-TRUST in a service com-
position, (ii) CTRUST in a collaboration context, as in [25] 
and (iii) a random selection of SPs in a service composition. 
SC-TRUST achieves a similar speedup to CTRUST for each 
group size. SC-TRUST performs marginally better than 
CTRUST initially. This is due to the logistical overhead in-
curred by CTRUST, because in a direct collaboration, the 
service requester must select the SPs and compose the ser-
vice directly. 
As the session progresses, CTRUST slightly overtakes SC-
TRUST in terms of speedup. This is probably due to the 
recurring overhead involved in communicating with the 
middleware layer. However, the difference between both 
models is statistically insignificant at a significance level, 
α=0.05, as shown in Table 2. Therefore, we can conclude 
that SC-TRUST provides as much utility gain for the SR as 
CTRUST, whilst providing the benefits of an automatic ser-
vice composition. For example, using SC-TRUST, the SR 
does not need to request and assess SPs directly. Also, the 
SR does not incur energy and computation costs involved 
in running a service composition, as these are shifted to 
and borne by the middleware. Moreover, the SR does not 
need to keep a record of known SPs but can rely on the 
middleware to select appropriate SPs according to its ser-
vice request. 
Additionally, it is evident that the use of SC-TRUST in-
creases the speedup quite significantly as compared to a 
random selection. We observe that SC-TRUST outperforms 
the random selection and that there is a consistent increase 
in the speedup even when the utilisation level of available 
download SPs is almost 80% (i.e. the number of selected SPs 
in set Q is 8, which is denoted as n(Q) = 8). Thus, SC-TRUST 
selects the most reliable SPs for service provision until there 
is no alternative. Above 6 used download SPs, the speedup 
of the random selection begins to sharply increase to match 
that of SC-TRUST and eventually a similar speedup is 
achieved at n(Q) = 10. This is because SC-TRUST accurately 
selects the most trustworthy SPs first. Therefore, the 
 
Fig. 3. Plot of Speed-up against varied sizes of the set Q of download 
SPs working in parallel. The figure shows the speed-up achieved us-
ing SC-TRUST in a service composition, compared to a random se-
lection of SPs, or to CTRUST in a similar collaborative context. 
TABLE 2 
TWO-TAILED PAIRED SAMPLE T-TEST COMPARING THE SPEEDUP 
OBTAINED USING SC-TRUST, CTRUST AND RANDOM MODES 







Observations 100 100 
P value at 
(α=0.05) 
4.25E-14 0.053 (lowest 
value obtained) 
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marginal increase in speedup reduces as n(Q) approaches 
n(S) (i.e. the total number of SPs). This is because the ran-
dom mode is more likely to select trustworthy SPs, which 
were originally left out, as n(Q) increases. When n(Q) = n(S), 
there is no difference in speedup between both modes, as 
the trust model cannot perform any choice due to (𝑛
𝑛
) = 1. 
Therefore, given that the speedup achieved is compara-
ble to the results that were obtained in [25] and [40], we 
conclude that the transparent trust composition in SC-
TRUST yields an accurate trust score with a performance 
level equalling that of CTRUST. Also, utilising SC-TRUST 
in a service composition increases the utility gained by the 
SR with no significant overhead incurred, whilst providing 
the trust-based security required for the realization of all 
the potential benefits of an SOA-based IoT. 
4.3 Evaluating Trust Model Accuracy, Resilience 
and Convergence 
In evaluating the accuracy and convergence, it is necessary 
to establish the ground truth. The ground truth value is ob-
tained by computing the trust score of an SP based on the 
perfect information of its behaviour and trust characteris-
tics. This information is obtained from the record of the 
random trust behaviour assigned to each SP at the start of 
the simulation. In real-world applications, neither the SR 
nor the middleware would have perfect knowledge of the 
behaviour of any SP. Hence, there is the need for a trust 
model in the first instance. A trust model which performs 
accurately in simulations by closely matching known 
ground truth values in a reasonable time will perform well 
in real-world applications. Trust resilience is a measure of 
the ability of the model to adapt to changes in the behav-
iour of SPs and maintain a high level of performance (in 
terms of the utility derived by the SR) under such circum-
stances. This is important because the trust characteristics 
of SPs may be changed during a session due to malicious 
or non-malicious reasons. A resilient trust model must 
identify and adapt to these changes and converge to the 
new trust score quickly and accurately. By doing this, a 
high-level of utility is maintained (as current high-per-
forming nodes are selected) and trust risks are minimized. 
The results obtained for SC-TRUST are presented in Fig. 4-
7.  
To generate sufficient interactions for these evaluations, 
the CD sessions were adapted for collaborative streaming. 
The only difference is that instead of waiting for the entire 
content to be downloaded before consumption by the SR, 
each downloaded block is streamed instantly to the SR. If 
the stream progresses successfully with no block missing, 
then the SCR increases. The inverse is also true. Similarly, 
if there is no buffering, then the CBA is increased. If the 
block arrives but not in time or sequence, then the SR au-
tomatically gives a negative feedback score on the CBA. 
SC-TRUST decomposes the SR’s feedbacks. Each streaming 
session includes 400-800 blocks and an equivalent number 
of interactions. 
Fig. 4 shows the results obtained on the SCR parameter 
after both trust composition and decomposition. Since the 
SCR parameter is unique to the aggregation service class, 
the decomposed trust scores only affect the selected aggre-
gation SP. A smoothed plot of the decomposed SCR values 
in Fig. 4 shows that it converges from default state (no pre-
vious interaction) to the ground truth in less than 400 in-
teractions. This is slightly higher than the ≈300 interactions 
required by CTRUST to converge to the ground truth. The 
reason is that the interactions in this simulation are shorter 
than those in the CTRUST simulation. Overall, the dura-
tion of the sessions in both models are similar. Therefore, 
SC-TRUST shows a high degree of convergence and accu-
racy. The fluctuations seen in the raw data are expected, as 
the utility of the SR and its perception of the composed ser-
vice are sensitive to changes in the behaviour of the SP. 
 
Fig. 4. Convergence of a Trust Parameter to the ground truth based 
on the decomposition of feedback from the SR. 
Fig. 5. Comparison of the trust accuracy and convergence properties 
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However, if the trust characteristics of the SP are con-
sistent, then the decomposed trust value will always con-
verge to the ground truth. 
In Fig. 5, the SCR measured by SC-TRUST is compared 
to that of CTRUST. We see that while the value of CTRUST 
is closer to the ground truth, SC-TRUST follows the same 
pattern with a slight lag in the measurement of the trust 
score. However, this difference is statistically insignificant. 
It should be recalled that these values were decomposed 
transparently from the SR’s feedbacks. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the trust decomposition method in the 
model not only converges to the ground truth but offers a 
level of accuracy on par with CTRUST, but in a service 
composition context. It is observed that the trend in both 
plots is similar. This is because SC-TRUST is built on top of 
CTRUST and utilizes some of the latter’s methods. 
In Fig. 6, the trust characteristic (ground truth) of the 
aggregation SP is modified to a higher value. It is observed 
that SC-TRUST converges quickly to the new ground truth 
within 400 interactions. Also, it should be observed that 
SC-TRUST is conservative in trust evaluation; that is, the 
composed or decomposed trust value is never higher than 
the ground truth. This is in accordance with the specifica-
tions in Sections 3.2 and 3.3; therefore, the SR always re-
ceives the estimated level of utility or higher, but never 
lower. This, in turn, increases the SR’s trust in both the com-
posing platform and composition services offered on the 
platform. As previously noted, SC-TRUST slightly lags be-
hind CTRUST in the measured trust value, but this differ-
ence is insignificant and expected. CTRUST measures the 
trust scores from direct interactions; therefore, it is not suit-
able for transparent trust computations required in these 
service compositions. 
Finally, in Fig. 7, we investigate the trust properties of 
SC-TRUST by measuring a shared parameter. The CBA is 
a parameter common to all download SPs. Therefore, it is 
difficult to accurately decompose the SR’s feedback in a 
manner fair to each SP. However, due to the internal use of 
the IRI parameter to identify malicious and underperform-
ing SPs, SC-TRUST performs reasonably well in converg-
ing to the ground truth on this parameter. It is observed 
that while CTRUST may produce trust scores higher than 
the ground truth (and therefore misleading the SR in a ser-
vice composition), both the composed and decomposed 
trust scores in SC-TRUST are almost always lower than or 
equal to the ground truth. After 450 interactions, the trust 
characteristic of this SP is changed to a lower value. Again, 
SC-TRUST adapts and converges to the ground truth in a 
reasonable time, no more than required to establish and 
converge to the initial ground truth value. After 850 inter-
actions, the value of SC-TRUST is a little higher than the 
ground truth. In this exceptional case, however, the in-
crease over the ground truth is less than 1%. Therefore, SC-
TRUST produces reliable and highly accurate trust scores, 
within the margin of low and acceptable errors. 
From the above analysis, it is evident that SC-TRUST 
meets the requirements 10 and 11 of an ideal trust model 
for IoT service compositions, as enumerated in Section 2.2. 
In addition, as it inherits the properties of CTRUST, SC-
TRUST satisfies requirements 1-9 as well. In comparison to 
the few existing trust models for service composition, SC-
TRUST produces a more accurate and reliable score. For ex-
ample, the trust scores produced by the models in both [14] 
and [22] diverge significantly from the ground truth when 
the percentage of malicious SPs is greater than 30%. In con-
trast, SC-TRUST shows a high degree of resilience such that 
even when half of the SPs are malicious, it retains its high 
accuracy and convergence. 
5 RELATED WORK 
Only a few trust models for service composition exist in the 
literature. This is due, in part, to the complexity of modelling 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of the trust resilience of SC-TRUST to that of 
CTRUST on a unique parameter. 
Fig. 7. Comparison of the trust resilience of SC-TRUST to that of 
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trust in a decentralized manner [41]. Moreover, no previous 
works have provided methods for transparent trust compo-
sition and decomposition in IoT. Existing models measure 
trust mainly on social trust parameters, such as friendship, 
honesty, cooperativeness and kindness, based on direct ob-
servations and recommendations [16], [23], [42], [43]. The 
reasoning behind this modelling paradigm is the notion of 
the “social” nature of service-oriented IoT applications. 
Hence some social characteristics of human relationships 
are inaccurately applied and modelled in IoT. It is important 
to observe that the social nature of the IoT is much different 
from human social interactions. In IoT, the focus is much 
more on the ecosphere of humans, the environment, and 
smart things. Users interacting with services need not a re-
lationship with the devices providing such services, or their 
owners. Depending on the type of service being provided, 
the SRs may not need to be co-located or share the same 
community of interest with SPs or their owners. 
The primary goal of the SR in trusting a service or SP is the 
provision of a reliable, quality service that meets the specifi-
cation of the SR without posing any risks. Thus, while a so-
cial interaction exists in the IoT, the relationships formed, 
and the parameters for measuring those relationships, are 
based on the required functional properties of the interac-
tion context; that is the request and provision of a service. 
Moreover, it is not reasonable to directly apply the aspects 
of trust, as it applies in human relationships, to evaluate 
computational trust without some conceptual adaptation 
represented by mathematical models [44]. Even in human 
circles, the meaning of trust must be implied from the con-
text and depends on the subjective assessment of the trustor 
[45], [46]. Even in human relationships, trust is predomi-
nantly functional, except for some cases of absolute trust or 
distrust. Therefore, in adapting trust to the SIoT, the notions 
of context and function must be preserved because they 
form the basis of trust [28]. 
In [47], a self-enforcing, privacy-preserving and decen-
tralised TMS for SIoT is proposed. The protocol makes use 
of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in securing the 
network and for the reliable update of trust scores. How-
ever, the cryptographic protocol used is computationally 
intensive. While the computational overhead is managea-
ble on systems with adequate computing resources, it is im-
practical for use on IoT devices typically with limited com-
puting resources. Also, the model does not satisfy the trust 
resilience property because it does not adapt to changes in 
the node behaviour during a trust session. Moreover, the 
model neither assigns weights to different trust parameters 
to indicate the trustor’s subjective preferences, nor includes 
trust parametrization. Therefore, it cannot be applied to dif-
ferent contexts. 
In [48], a trustworthiness inference framework for SIoT 
is proposed based on familiarity and similarity trust, with 
contextual information based on time and location. The 
model does not consider the notion of functional trust or 
service contexts, which are important to guide service com-
positions. A trust-based service architecture for IoT is pro-
posed in [49], with emphasis on improved efficiency of IoT 
services. However, the model operates in a centralized 
cloud architecture, thus limiting its applicability to service 
compositions in the IoT. The model contains no notion of 
trust parametrization or service contexts. In [50], a trust ar-
chitecture for software-defined networks in IoT is pro-
posed. The model uses reputation evaluation for trust es-
tablishment, with no notion of objective, functional param-
eters on which trust could be measured in a service-based 
application. 
In [51], a reputation-based trust system is proposed for 
IoT applications. However, a rigorous analysis conducted 
in [25] shows that reputation-based models used in IoT are 
vulnerable to trust-related attacks such as bad-mouthing, 
ballot stuffing, and opportunistic service attacks, espe-
cially in a decentralized architecture. A similar argument 
may be applied to the trust-enhanced recommender sys-
tem proposed in [52]. TMSs for dynamic trust management 
for SOA-IoT applications and service management in SIoT 
are proposed in [14], [22], [23]. The models produced are 
similar and measure the trust between nodes based on sim-
ilarities in friendship, social contact, and community of in-
terests. Functional constraints of the service contexts are 
not considered. Likewise, the models do not account for an 
SR’s preferences and requirements, which should guide 
the service composition in an ideal trust model. Indeed, the 
models focus on achieving “subjective trust”, which is a 
recommendation score primarily based on similarities and 
relationships between the owners of the IoT devices. This 
is contrary to the actual social nature of service applica-
tions in IoT, which should be based on the service context. 
However, the models do consider transparent trust com-
position for IoT based on the workflow, using a method 
derived from reliability/fault analysis. Thus, the trust score 
of a service composed of two microservices in sequence 
(series) is given to be the product of trust scores of the mi-
croservices. This assumption does not hold in many ser-
vice applications, as discussed below. 
It is possible to compose a service of high trust from mi-
croservices having low or average trust scores. Take the case 
of a pizzeria which provides a pizza ordering service, makes 
excellent pizza but has slow delivery times. As a result, it is 
given an average trust score by an SR that gives significant 
weighting to delivery times. Suppose this SR also has a trust 
relationship with a ride-hire service which has exceptionally 
low wait times but rude drivers. The SR is uneasy for the du-
ration of the ride because of the driver’s continuous boorish 
remarks; therefore, the SR gives a low rating to this service. 
Suppose that the two services are composed sequentially 
with the pizzeria producing the pizza and the fast ride-hire 
service delivering it to the SR. If the composition is done 
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transparently to the SR, then the composed service would 
have a high trust rating, because the pizza is delivered fast 
and the SR does not hear the driver’s remarks. This is con-
trary to the results that the reliability formula mentioned ear-
lier would have produced: low trust X average trust = lower 
trust. Also, reliability analysis states that the reliability of a 
group of components is increased when the components op-
erate in parallel, for redundancy. However, this does not nec-
essarily apply to trust composition in IoT service composi-
tion.  For example, composing two highly trusted services, 
one with an average delay and the other with an average en-
ergy efficiency, in a parallel workflow may increase both the 
response time and energy usage; consequently, the SR may 
assign a lower trust score to the resulting composed service. 
From these examples, it is evident that to accurately 
compose trust in a service composition, there must be a 
mechanism to assign weights to each parameter, such that 
parameters irrelevant to the service composition (such as 
the driver’s behaviour in the previous example) would have 
little or no effect on the overall trust score; this is lacking in 
most of the models reviewed. Moreover, most of these mod-
els do not consider the temporal nature of trust and its effect 
on the decay of previously accumulated trust. It is neces-
sary to track the behaviour of SPs in relation to the func-
tional trust parameters and to detect and respond to 
changes over time. In contrast, SC-TRUST has been de-
signed and evaluated to address these research gaps and 
satisfy the requirements for an ideal trust model for service 
composition in the IoT, thus justifying its novel contribution 
to this research area. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we discussed the suitable trust properties re-
quired by a trust model and TMS to guide service composi-
tions in the IoT. We studied the classifications of composi-
tions with respect to service classes and workflows. We also 
analysed the effects of the workflows on transparent trust 
composition, aggregation and decomposition. Based on 
these analyses, SC-TRUST was designed as a suitable model 
for service compositions in the SOA-based IoT context. The 
simulation evaluations show that the use of SC-TRUST in a 
service composition increased the utility gained. Also, SC-
TRUST showed a robust performance in trust accuracy, con-
vergence, and resilience. Therefore, the model minimizes 
the impact of trust-related attacks, including ballot stuffing, 
bad-mouthing, and opportunistic service attacks. SC-
TRUST was modelled with the platform characteristics of 
IoT in consideration, so its trust evaluations and algorithms 
require minimal computational resources. In addition, the 
flexibility of the design ensures that the model can be easily 
applied to any service composition context. Thus, SC-
TRUST addresses critical gaps by providing a dynamic, sys-
tematic, and holistic approach to trust modelling in SOA-
based IoT, especially for trust-based service compositions. In 
addition, the elegant solutions for transparent trust compo-
sition and decomposition are novel contributions. 
In this work, we have not considered the effect of con-
straints, such as price and energy, on the service composi-
tion. It is observed that, by increasing performance and re-
ducing trust attacks, SC-TRUST reduces overall energy us-
age. This requires further evaluations beyond the scope of 
this paper. Also, the prices which SPs charge for their ser-
vices may affect their selection depending on the limit of 
the SR’s budget. However, the price is not a trust character-
istic, as it is not a functional parameter of the composition 
context, but rather an external constraint on the process. It 
may be argued that more trustworthy compositions would 
generally cost more because the price is an incentive for an 
SP to produce better services. It would be beneficial to 
study the effects of external constraints, such as price and 
an SR’s budget, on the service composition process and the 
trust scores of SPs. We will consider these issues as part of 
our future work. 
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